Four firms dominate the international uranium enrichment market. Two reasons for this industrial concentration are (1) enrichment capacity can be used to make nuclear weapons, and hence its spread has been controlled through many mechanisms, including technology classification, and (2) increasing returns to scale, also known as, positive economies of scale. Historically, strong increasing returns to scale in gaseous diffusion technology development and commercialization prevented non-nuclear weapons states from considering uranium enrichment. Later, gas centrifuge technology allowed new entrants to build commercially competitive enrichment plants at much smaller sizes than diffusion technology and at a fraction of the electricity cost. At the same time, the nations that privatized or host privately-owned enrichment facilities have strongly discouraged others from developing enrichment capacity. Therefore, these firms have been benefiting from the exercise of national power to prevent entry into this market. Had there been no control on enrichment capacity, the uncompetitive diffusion capacity could have been retired and the market price could have been lower. Further, non-proliferation is not these firms' primary mission. In situations like this (with increasing returns to scale and difficult to evaluate externalities), firms are usually regulated or nationalized, because free markets do not necessarily lead to the socially optimal level of concentration and diversity in supply, i.e., a long-run equilibrium where the industry is necessarily concentrated such that there is no proliferating entry, but is sufficiently diverse so that no one national group can dictate prices, contract terms, or non-proliferation policy.
The International Uranium Enrichment Market
In the debate of how to assure nuclear fuel (such that nations considering the building of nuclear power plants do not also consider building uranium enrichment plants), there is little discussion of whether free (unregulated) markets can provide assurances that enrichment capacity will be available to all customers at reasonable prices. There are at least four markets in the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle that must be reviewed to determine assurance of supply:
(1) uranium mining and milling, (2) uranium conversion, (3) uranium enrichment, and (4) nuclear fuel fabrication. Rothwell (2009) finds that the nuclear fuel fabrication of low-enriched uranium into light-water reactor fuel rods is a competitive industry with barriers to entry to discourage investment in fuel fabrication by nations with small nuclear industries. Future papers will examine competition in uranium mining and milling (updating Rothwell 1980) and uranium conversion. This paper examines whether market forces in the uranium enrichment market can lead both to economic efficiency and to socially optimal levels of assured alternative sources of supply, given the risk of enrichment technology spread.
Four firms dominate the international uranium enrichment market: United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC, which was privatized in the mid-1990s), TENEX/Rosatom (Russia), Eurodif/Areva (France), and Urenco (with plants in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). The United States (through the Atomic Energy Commission) monopolized the Western enrichment market with gaseous diffusion and Russia monopolized the Eastern market.
The U.S. commercial dominance of gaseous diffusion ended with the entry of Eurodif, a consortium of countries with France as the diffusion technology provider and only producer.
However since the 1980s, firms using gas centrifuge technology, including those in Russia and the British-Dutch-German Urenco, have captured an increasing share of the market. USEC's share of enrichment capacity declined from 39% in 1995 to 14% in 2008, as earlier diffusion facilities (at Oak Ridge, TN, and Portsmith, OH) were retired. Table I shows changes in capacity shares over the last decade. (Not all of this capacity directly serves the fuel market, as discussed in Section 2; for example, Russia is using excess capacity to slightly enrich uranium to mix with down-blended, weapons-grade, highly-enriched uranium.) The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures the degree of concentration in an industry. [1] HHI ranges from 100 with an industry of 100 equal-sized firms, to 5,000 in an industry with a duopoly, to 10,000 for a monopoly. The U.S. Department of Justice has considered industries with HHIs above 1,800 to the "highly concentrated," and would have discouraged a merger in these industries if the HHI were to increase by more than 100 points.
Although highly concentrated, from 1995 to 2008, the HHI changed little in this industry as USEC facilities were retired and Russian capacity increased. In the last column of Table I , the HHI is calculated under the assumption that Areva and Urenco ("Euro") do not compete (because they are now using the same centrifuge manufacturer, ETC), the HHI would increase by 600 points, i.e., the industry would become even more concentrated as measured by this metric. U S E C 3 9 % 2 3 % 1 6 % 1 4 % 1 4 % R u ssia T e n e x 2 9 % 4 1 % 4 5 % 4 7 % 4 7 % F ra n c e A re v a 2 2 % 2 2 % 2 2 % 2 0 % 3 5 % E u ro p e a n U re n c o 7 % 1 1 % centrifuge facilities coming online, market capacity, price level, and price volatility will be uncertain during the coming decade. Can we be assured that a international free market in uranium enrichment will lead to socially-optimal levels of enrichment capacity over the foreseeable future?
Neo-classical economic theory shows that society is better off when market prices equal the cost of production, including a reasonable (risk-adjusted) return on capital. When prices do not reflect the costs of production or consumption, economists conclude that the market has "failed," i.e., it has failed to achieve the socially-optimal level of output or investment.
Markets fail for at least four reasons: (1) in industries where there are strong increasing returns to scale (also known as positive scale economies), the largest firms can increase market share to monopoly or near monopoly levels, then raise prices, for example, in software, particularly in operating systems; (2) where unpriced inputs or outputs, known as externalities, influence another producer or consumer's profits or well-being, for example, greenhouse gas production, which is not priced; (3) where consumers cannot be excluded from consumption, for example, from national and local security; and (4) where there is systematic asymmetric information between the buyer and seller, for example in markets where buyers cannot know the riskiness of the seller's financial instruments. See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2009, p. 315+) .
While there might be more than one source of market failure in the international uranium enrichment market (for example, the unpriced proliferation externality associated with enrichment technology), I will focus on the issue of increasing returns to scale. With increasing returns to scale, (1) small producers (such as new entrants) have little economic incentive to enter to compete with established and growing larger producers, and (2) larger producers can eventually drive smaller rivals from the market. This leads to market power where prices can be higher than costs, or where other concessions can be extracted, e.g., the assumption of price risk by the customer, or market power can be leveraged into other markets, such as nuclear reactors.
However in the enrichment industry, increasing returns provides a barrier to entry, thus increasing the proliferation resistance of the industry, and reducing the social cost of the proliferation externality. But increasing returns in enrichment reduces both market price discipline and proliferation. Given increasing returns, the economic issue is whether free markets in uranium enrichment can assure optimal long run levels of investment and non-proliferation.
Most observers of the enrichment industry assume there are increasing returns to scale. [3] The Appendix tests this assumption and proposes a top-down, microeconomic-engineering model of the industry. Section 2 uses this model to show that if enrichment prices were determined by competitive markets, prices should fall with the retirement of the diffusion capacity. If prices remain high, or if a monopoly develops, or if enrichment technology continues to proliferate from privately-owned enrichers, free markets are not leading to socially optimal outcomes. Hence, Section 3 argues that some form of international market intervention (beyond the patchwork of national subsidies) could be necessary to insure an optimal diversity of nonproliferating capacity investment and prices near production cost. [4] Given the small size of economic profits in this industry and the consequences of proliferation, there is little to be lost in terms of economic efficiency if enrichment price regulation eases the creation of nonproliferation agreements with nations considering entry into uranium enrichment. Figure 1 . [5] As discussed in the Appendix, the cost of gaseous diffusion enrichment is driven by the price of electricity. As the price of electricity has risen, the cost of diffusion enrichment has risen above the cost of centrifuge enrichment, making gaseous diffusion plants the marginal producers, i.e., those that supply the last segment of demand. As the marginal producers, diffusion enrichers' costs (in association with market demand) appear to determine the spot market price. To represent this market, the Appendix estimates average SWU cost in 2008 dollars for uranium enrichment. [6] The Appendix presents a microeconomic-engineering model of the currently planned centrifuge enrichment plants, and statistically estimates scale parameters.
The Emerging Duopoly in the International Uranium Enrichment Market
Using long-run levelized cost as a proxy for long-run marginal cost, levelized costs are used to construct SWU supply curves for 2008 ( Figure 2 ) and 2020 ( Figure 3 ). [7] In Figure 2 it is assumed that Russian production is limited such that the Novouralsk facility (with 12.45M SWU per year) is not competing in the international market (due to agreements associated with blending down weapons-grade, highly-enriched uranium and domestic commitments); see Mikhailov (1995) . In Figure 2 , about one quarter of the international enrichment market (Russian) is low cost (less than $60), one quarter (Urenco) is moderate cost (between $60-$100), and one half of the market (gaseous diffusion) is high cost (more than $100 With the retirement of the world's diffusion capacity and no international constraints on Russian participation in the market, the supply curve for enrichment services could shift by 2020 to a situation more like that in Figure 3 . [8] Assuming growth of 12.5 percent to 45M SWU, world requirements could be satisfied by all enrichers, and maximum total revenues would be approximately $4,500M (in 2008 dollars). [9] However, as today, USEC could be the marginal producer, so a competitive market should equilibrate to cover USEC's new levelized production costs (e. Therefore, as diffusion capacity is retired and prices fall to reflect a decline in costs (following competitive market forces), because of their more mature technology, Russia and the Europeans could earn economic profits, but Japan's Rokkasho and USEC's ACP might not earn anything above their reasonable capital and production costs. Anticipation of this situation could make financing for USEC difficult to acquire at a cost of capital that will allow them to be competitive, particularly if credit is tight and their credit rating continues to decline (the U.S.
DOE is providing $2,000M in loan guarantees to USEC, see Kinney 2008) . The financial crisis could slow ACP completion, thus postponing the retirement of USEC's diffusion capacity, and supporting a higher market price.
Russia is building additional enrichment capacity. One method for increasing enrichment market share is the creation of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) in Angarsk,
Siberia (see Braun 2006) . The Angarsk enrichment and conversion plants have been combined with Kazakhstan's uranium mines. A Kazakhstan fuel pellet plant could be upgraded to provide nuclear fuel fabrication services. If the IUEC could provide nuclear fuel at a lower market price, it could increase its nuclear fuel market share, and thus Russia's enrichment market share.
Implications of Enrichment Duopoly Emergence to USEC and the United States
With the retirement of diffusion capacity during the next decade, the artificially high price of enrichment could fall. (It is "artificially" high due to entry barriers: were there open markets in enrichment, new cheaper capacity would have forced the retirement of diffusion technology much sooner). Entry of new participants into the enrichment market is constrained by non-proliferation considerations, as well as by commercial interests. The enrichment industry is now being more closely watched with the discovery of the Pakistani enrichment smuggling network, which stole centrifuge technology from Urenco; see Braun and Chyba (2004) .
Without market intervention, prices could fall to competitive levels; this implies there could be no economic profits in this industry for anyone but the Russians and Europeans. For this reason, the financial outlook of these uranium enrichers has been bleak, prompting a Standard and Poor's analyst to write:
"Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'A-/A-2' long-and short-term corporate credit ratings on Europe-based uranium enrichment company Urenco Ltd. . . The enrichment market is undergoing very drastic changes, as TENEX (Rosatom)-which controls roughly 50% of global enrichment capacity but only 24% market share among end-customers-is looking to increase its share of direct sales to end-customers. The extent to which this will affect Western enrichment suppliers-USEC Inc. (B-/Negative/--), Areva (not rated), and Urenco-over the medium term remains to be seen, but will be strongly influenced by ongoing political and trade negotiations . . . The other major industry change is an expected phase-out of the non-economical gaseous diffusion plants used by USEC and Areva. . ." (These ratings were re-affirmed on April 24, 2008)
"A-" implies that Standard & Poor's believes that (1) "A" implies "economic situation can affect finance" and (2) the negative sign ("-") implies that it is likely to be downgraded; A-> BB > BB-> B+ > B-are lower and lower credit ratings for "non-investment" grade bonds, so called, "junk bonds." So, since 2002 USEC has been forced to pay junk bond rates on its debt, while trying to finance a new, First-of-a-Kind technology. This situation has been deteriorating; see Table II . 10-K, December 31, 2008 (Feb. 26, 2009 Therefore, assuring adequate diversity of enrichment capacity over the long term could be problematic without some more comprehensive market intervention (than continued subsidization from governments to private firms). Of course, a Russian-European duopoly in enrichment might provide an adequate diversity of supply. The U.S. Government must determine how many suppliers should be in the enrichment market to maintain some market competition or whether any form of market regulation is necessary or possible.
The U.S. Government has been subsidizing the USEC for over a decade (due to the On the other hand, American electric utility demand can be supplied by Americans working at the Areva and Urenco plants in Idaho and New Mexico, and by the Russians through the extension of current contracts. Therefore, it is not in the American electric utilities' interest to support USEC's the high prices, but it might be in their interest to support the existence of USEC as a hedge against dependence on one or two suppliers. There might be no public support for USEC aside from those interest groups that have directly or indirectly benefited or will directly or indirectly benefit from the federal subsidies that have been given or will be given to USEC.
Unregulated enrichment markets will not necessarily lead to a socially optimal diversity of enrichment suppliers: a long-run equilibrium where the industry is necessarily concentrated such that there is no proliferating entry, but is sufficiently diverse so that no one national group can dictate prices, contract terms, or non-proliferation policy. United States decision makers should determine (1) whether a Russian-European duopoly is in the national interest of the United States given the dependence of the nuclear navy on domestically produced highly enriched uranium (uranium enriched above 20%), and (2) whether to forever subsidize USEC, or nationalize it before or after it is pushed by market forces and financial pressure to file for bankruptcy.
Appendix: A Microeconomic Engineering Model of Uranium Enrichment Facilities
Paul J.C. other expenses, let the total annual cost of producing total annual SWU be
• K is the total capital investment cost (TCIC, defined in EMWG 2007) measured in millions, M, of 2008 dollars, and p K is the annual capital charge rate;
• L is the number of employees, and p L is annual (burdened) salary of an employee;
• E is the electricity input MWh, and p E is the price of electricity in dollars per MWh; and
• M represents the cost of materials consumed, and p M is the price of materials. [10] Assume that (1) M is a linear function of K, and (2) p M is expressed in percent per year of K (e.g., set p M to the physical depreciation rate). Let
where the summation is over the commercial life of the facility, all construction costs are discounted to the commercial operation date, and r is the appropriate discount rate. (Following Harding, 2005, p. 9 , there is an implicit assumption of a constant annual capacity factor of 100 percent, because "If machines are stopped, risk is they will not start again.")
Returns to scale in cost is the ratio of the percentage change in total cost, TC, with respect to a percentage change in output, SWU:
For example, if output is increased by 10%, and total cost increases by less than 10%, then there are increasing returns to scale, and average costs are falling. If output is increased by 10%, and total cost increases by more than 10%, there are decreasing returns to scale, and average costs are rising. For many production processes, average costs fall with increases in capacity (because average fixed costs are falling). At some capacity range, average costs are constant, but beyond that range, average costs rise with decreasing returns to scale. This yields a "U"-shaped average cost curve.
However, in industries with increasing returns to scale (where there are large fixed, capital costs), the average cost curve continually declines throughout the relevant range of industry demand. This yields a "bath-tub-shaped" average cost curve, where average cost eventually increases at some very large size. This type of cost structure implies that large firms could have lower costs than smaller firms. If there is no arrangement to divide the market and profits, the smaller firms will be driven from the industry (or will never enter). At the limit, one large firm could dominate the industry.
The remainder of this Appendix proposes and tests whether there are increasing returns to scale in (1) capital, K (i.e., ∂ln K /∂ln Q) and (2) labor, L (i.e., ∂ln L /∂ln Q) for centrifuge capacity (there is not enough information to estimate returns to scale in energy and materials).
With these input prices and estimates of the derivatives of the inputs with respect to changes in facility size, returns to scale in total cost are examined through constructing and analyzing the resulting average cost curves in Section A.4.
A.1. Estimating New Centrifuge Enrichment Facility Costs [11]
A.1.
Estimating New Centrifuge Facility Capital Costs
Overnight cost, k, is transformed into total capital investment cost, K, with the addition of Interest During Construction and contingency, i.e., K = (1 + c) · k, where c is a percentage markup for IDC and contingency. Overnight construction cost, k i , for new centrifuge facilities is estimated with information on five facilities in the United States, France, and Brazil:
(1) The American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) is being built in Ohio by USEC, using a U.S. The descriptive statistics for these plant data are The price of capital, p K , is the annual capital charge rate. Following Cabrera-Palmer and Rothwell (2008) , the model uses a 5 percent real cost of capital with capital cost amortization over 30 years, i.e., p K = 6.5 percent. (The real cost of capital is equal to the nominal cost of capital minus the expected inflation rate; with expected inflation at 3 percent, the nominal cost of capital would be 8 percent, i.e., one appropriate for a regulated utility.) Also, the model assumes the annual physical depreciation cost is 1 percent of overnight costs, i.e., p M M = 0.01 k = 0.01/1.1748 K = 0.0085 K). So, p KM = 6.5% + 0.85% = 7.4%.
A.1.2. Estimating New Centrifuge Facility Labor Costs
Second, regarding labor, L, the announced projected staff size of the ACP is 500
employees (USEC 2004) , the staff size of NEF has been announced to be 210, Areva announced that it would be hiring at least 250 full-time employees at Idaho, and the staff size of Resende is estimated to be 100 (Cabrera-Palmer and Rothwell 2008) . Also, while not a new facility, there are 390 employees at Urenco's Capenhurst facility (producing 3.4M SWU per year); this provides a benchmark and another observation. Because one of the observations is different from one in Table A .I, Table A .II provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for this data set.
The variables have been scaled so their means are similar. Here, the minimum value for the number of employees, L, is 1.0 (x 100) employees, and the maximum is 5 (x 100) employees.
The minimum value for SWU is the same as above, but the maximum is 3.8 million SWU per year. RATE is as above, because it is assumed that Capenhurst and George Besse II use the same technology.
The number of employees is highly correlated (82%) with the both the number of SWU and with the RATE; SWU and RATE are positively correlated (57%). Together these correlations imply (1) centrifuges with higher annual output require more maintenance, as suggested by one astute referee, [x] and (2) much of the variance explained by RATE is also explained by SWU, so that they will not both be significant when they both appear in the same equation. 
A.1.3. Estimating New Centrifuge Facility Energy Costs
Third, the electricity consumption for ETC and ACP centrifuges are from WNA ( will likely have lower costs than the USEC's ACP.
A.1.4. Estimates of New Centrifuge Facility Costs
• The levelized cost of Brazil's small facility will likely be twice as high as the cost at the ACP, and almost three times as much as cost at the Urenco facilities.
A.2. Projecting Replacement Costs of Operating Centrifuge Facilities
This section approximates the cost structure of the existing commercial centrifuge facilities owned by Urenco, JNFL, and Rosatom. See Tables A.IV and A.V. Urenco has three production facilities at Capenhurst, United Kingdom, with 3.4M SWU; Almelo, Netherlands, with 2.9M SWU; and Gronau, Germany, with 1.8M SWU. The overnight replacement costs (in 2008 dollars) are estimated using Equation (4.4) . Because these facilities have already been built and some of the capital has been depreciated, there is no contingency or IDC, i.e., total capital investment cost (K) is equal to the estimated overnight replacement cost (k Therefore, assume that (1) the real cost of capital is 2.5%, leading to a capital recovery factor of 4.8% (versus 6.5% for the other centrifuge facilities), (2) the burdened cost of labor is $60,000 equal to that in Brazil, and (3) the cost of electricity of $53/MWh (implicitly assuming that the cost of transmission and distribution is zero). See Table A .V. The estimated levelized cost in 2008 dollars is between $28 for the largest facility and $45 for the smallest facility, lower than at all other international facilities. It is possible that costs are even lower, as suggested in Bukharin (2004) .
A.3. Projecting Costs of the Diffusion Facilities
Finally, the model is used to approximate the cost structure of the existing commercial diffusion plants owned by USEC and Eurodif. See Table A. 
A.4. Estimating the Long-Run Average Costs of Centrifuge Facilities
A reciprocal functional form is used to estimate the relationship between average cost ( AC ) and size ( SWU ) in these simulated data:
Average cost is calculated for hypothetical plants of many sizes at costs of capital of 5% and 10%. The relationship between average costs and the reciprocal of size is estimated using OLS. [12] Before analyzing this information, note that the model is based on three centrifuge technologies at different maturities: The Urenco TC-12 centrifuge has been in commercial operation for more than a decade and can be reproduced at N th -of-a-Kind cost. The smaller Brazilian centrifuge is in its First-of-a-Kind commercial deployment. The ACP larger centrifuge is being scaled up from prototype to commercial size. Consider the estimated SWU per centrifuge in Guizzo (2006, p. 6) : "The less technically advanced machines, such as those reportedly used by Iran, each have a capacity of 3 SWU per year. State-of-the-art machines, such as those used by Urenco, are estimated to have a capacity of 50 to 100 SWU. The new American centrifuges are designed to operate at 300 SWU, assuming they will work. Brazil's centrifuges have a capacity of around 10 SWU or a little more, sources familiar with the project told me.
These sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the project, say that the machines are nearly 2 meters tall and are supercritical. They add that
Brazilian navy researchers are now attempting to increase the length of the rotor without having to redesign its driving and bearing systems. That modification, they say, could improve the machines' performance." Therefore, these are conditional estimates that should be revised when more information is publicly available.
[13] Several functional forms were estimated, including semi-log, reciprocal, and log-reciprocal.
See Johnston and Dinardo (1997, p. 44) . Also, the number of centrifuges (equal to plant SWU per year divided by SWU per machine per year) was also used as an explanatory variable, but was not significant in any of the OLS estimates. The linear, log-linear, and log-reciprocal models had the highest explanatory power, and no model yielded decreasing returns to scale. This was also true for Equations 5, discussed below.
[14] See Upson (2001, p. 1) : "The superiority of the no-maintenance philosophy over larger diameter, longer centrifuges requiring maintenance, was never in doubt."
